General Context
The profound changes that occurred in the world over the last century expanded the geopolitical confrontations. At the same time with older trials for the establishment or maintenance of the spheres of interest, we are contemporaries of new rivalries, especially at the economic and religious level, both between states as well as within them. Thus, the assertion is confirmed, namely that in order to continue to exist, people are in need of vital space, of course, not in the sense of territorial expansion, otherwise they are condemned to dismantling and subsequently to extinction. Therefore, the world geopolitics must be thought globally, to enable a uniform solution, using the same unit of measure, for any problem, in any area of the planet. Today's challenges, more complex in nature, belong, in general, to terrorism, the organized crime, threats to the environment, and critical infrastructure.
New risks of a transnational type need an integrative approach that ensures both the use of new tools and techniques, as well as a strategy to respond to the asymmetric threats. Typological diversified area of hazards and threats to critical infrastructure has resulted in the need for a revision of the European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection, promotion of a revised form of the program, as well as practical arrangements for its implementation.
Objectives
The new approach to the European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection is based on the revision of the program [4] in 2006 and on the Council of Europe's Directive No. 114/2008 [5] , which reflects the choices of the Member States of the European Union, as well as of interested parties in this complex field. DOI: 10.1515 DOI: 10. /kbo-2015 The revised version contains an inventory of the elements of the existing program and proposes a new approach to problems in the field based on the implementation of activities on prevention, preparedness and response. An important component of the revised program addresses the interdependence [6] [7] highlighted the fact that, so far, there has not been a great emphasis on the connections between critical infrastructures located in various sectors and neither on those beyond national borders. In order to protect critical infrastructures in an appropriate manner and to ensure a high level of resiliency a new approach that will cover this gap is required. To correctly identify the needs to improve the program it was decided to focus and target the efforts on four critical infrastructures of European dimension: EUROCONTROL [8] , Galileo [9] , the electricity transmission network [10] and the gas transmission network [11] . These were selected due to their panEuropean nature. On the basis of the conclusions they expect that other relevant infrastructures to be able to benefit from the results of this process and the tools developed in the activities with the 4 The sectoral approach of the directive represented a challenge for the Member States, but, basically, the analysis focuses not only on the sectoral boundaries, but rather follows an approach of "a system" or "a service" (e.g.: hospitals, financial services). A major benefit was, however, the fact that, at the community level, for the protection of the critical infrastructures, the general level of awareness and co-operation in the field mentioned in the European Union has increased, in particular as a result of the organization of various activities and forums held under the aegis of the Directive, in particular in the energy and transport sectors. At the same time, the existence of a legal instrument encouraged the policies for the protection of the critical national infrastructures. In those circumstances, Directive No. 114/2008 of the Council of Europe is considered essential by most actors involved in this field. In addition, it is expected that the benefits of the directive, in particular those relating to increasing awareness, to continue to grow. By this approach, an environment of trust and common goals can be sustained further on. information network related to critical infrastructures, a system based on information and communication for the exchange and analysis of information relating to critical infrastructure protection, studies and/or best practices among communities in the area. CIWIN was put in practice in October 2012, being operational since January, 2013. In the first few months of operation, there were positive contributions, including an increase in the use of statistics and of the section devoted to national objectives for CIWIN. CIWIN network was developed as a secured system of the European Commission of communication and information relating to the exchange of information in the field of critical infrastructure protection, which gives the members of European Commission the opportunity to discuss and exchange information, studies and best practices in all economic sectors. CIWIN platform was launched without the rapid alert component due to the fact that the Member States had considered that its safety measures are insufficient. CIWIN is expected to continue to improve as an interactive tool for the EU developing approach in the field of reference. It should be stressed that CIWIN will not revolutionize security in the European Union and that it should be considered as one of the many stages of implementation of the European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection. Therefore, CIWIN is an informatics tool intended to facilitate communication on issues related to the protection of critical infrastructure and provides functions (information bulletins, collaborative data storage, discussion boards, document and workflow management functions) which are current information on the internet. 
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External dimension of the
The answer-intervention priority directions:
• strengthening the links among the critical infrastructures and early warning systems, taking into account the fact that the early warning mechanisms for natural disasters may highlight possible threats to critical infrastructures; • assessment of the possibilities for the use of specialists to provide assistance concerning the long-term restoration of critical services, which can be mobilized at the request of the Member States. In the context described, the new approach of the European Union can encourage and support the development of critical infrastructure protection, at all levels, from the local and national, to European and international ones, by transforming the Union into a macrostructure that is more secured and better prepared in the face of threats to its critical infrastructures and by improving its resilience in case of disruptive events. EUROCONTROL functioning as a Network Manager and of CECCA, may be the subject of a case study on a large scale, developed by DGHOME in collaboration with other interested departments, aimed at identifying good practices in the implementation of the measures regarding the prevention, security and response, leading to the formulation of risk mitigation strategies which also contribute to a more suitable protection of critical infrastructures and sectors. Its complex infrastructure, responsive to a multitude of scenarios of threats, including cyber attacks, in which the disruption of its services can have a significant impact at the level of European economy, as well as the interrelationship of its subsystems that involve cascading effects/domino-type, can also be an interesting topic for a case study.
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[9] Space technology-based systems introduce a wide spectrum of applications that play a fundamental role in our daily work, and are critical for key areas of the economy and facilitate our security. With the increasing reliance on services provided by using spatial technology, the capability of the space infrastructure has become essential to our society. Any interruption in the operation, even partial, of the spatial infrastructure can have significant consequences for the proper functioning of economic activities and the safety and security of citizens, and it would disrupt the provision of urgent services. This applies in particular for Galileo -the European Global Navigation Satellite System (EGNSS) -which is the first space infrastructure owned by the European Union. A major failure, whether accidental or intentional, also EGNSS infrastructure would have an impact on users but will also affect many other critical infrastructures in which EGNSS services are deeply integrated: transport, telecommunications, trade and banking activities are based on EGNSS signals for synchronization, navigations and secure transactions. Galileo, as other spatial infrastructures, is subject to specific threats to satellites and signals. EGNSS transmissions may be susceptible to a number of threats through the prism of the connections of radiofrequency interference, such as unauthorized access and misuse, jamming, spoofing and cyber attack. The Galileo system has been subject to specific security processes designed to reduce the induced risks. Additionally, one of Galileo's services, The Public Regulated Service (PRS), was specifically enacted to assist the Member States and government-authorized users, for sensitive applications which require an effective access control provided on an unlimited and uninterrupted global scale.
In addition, the steady growth of the number of scrap space has become a serious threat to the resilience of space activities, including operation of constellation of Galileo satellites, of the space segment Copernicus, or national public and commercial satellites. To reduce the risk of collision it is necessary to identify and monitor satellites and space debris, cataloging positions and monitoring their trajectory, when the risk of collision was identified, to alert operators of satellites with a view to repositioning them. This activity is known as surveillance and monitoring of space (SMS) and is currently based in large part on the ground sensors, such as telescopes and cameras. Currently, there is no SMS capability at EU level: the satellite operators are dependent on data issued by US for anticollision alerts. The Commission issued a proposal for a European support program for the surveillance and monitoring of space. The objective of the program is the provision of assistance to Member States for their cooperation and interconnection capacity in order to provide SMS alerting anti-collision services at European level.
[10] As demonstrated in previous years, as a result of current outages on extended areas, a single incident affecting a significant element of the network, can affect the supply to the entire continent. Threats (produced by humans) have a similar cross-border operation, while the attackers or coordinated actions may concern the networks at regional, European or international level, in the case of cyber attacks. An interruption of the electricity supply of major dimensions occurred within the transmission network in Northern Germany, on November 4, 2006 and was felt in most parts of the continent, beyond the borders of Germany to France, Belgium, Austria, Slovenia and Spain. Even if the actions taken by energy transmission system operators (ETSO) have prevented power outage, this case is considered to be one of the most severe and major disruptions of this kind in Europe. The effects were major from the point of view of disruption in the supply of electricity at industrial and domestic level (more than 15 million households) as well, and the electricity-dependent services, such as transport, have been affected (for example: hundreds of railway transports were postponed or cancelled). Thus, it requires a coordinated mechanism of protection, involving all the operators and their sectoral branches. Risks associated to the threats described above can be adequately addressed only at the system level, bearing in mind that the integrity and the functionality of the entire system are affected. This sector (especially ENTSO-E) has already invested in CIP measures and has expressed support for a European Union approach that will integrate the requirements imposed by the rules of the internal market. The code of networks provides a legislative support for the incorporation of common methodologies of protection for European operators of electricity transport networks. The Commission can support this process, during the following years, in terms of providing CIP tools and methods. Additionally, the development towards Intelligent Networks requires enhanced synergies between the sectors of information technology and communications (ICT) and energy. More than ever, the industry and investors are worried about the prospect of cyber attacks. In this respect, the Commission has initiated actions through the Intervention Team for Intelligent Networks, in which experts from the ICT and energy sector put up a framework for evaluation of cyber security. This framework includes the evaluation of the current methodologies for a stable network, disseminating the analyses of threats and vulnerabilities related to Intelligent Networks and smart metering systems, as well as identify the best techniques for smart metering systems.
[11] Physical threats (from terrorism, the boycotts and strikes), destructive natural events (earthquakes, floods, low temperatures, storms) and commercial disputes to which this network is subjected, make it vulnerable and threaten Europe's access to natural gas. A relevant example of the effects of a disturbance on the transport network natural gas pipeline is that of the Fellowship pipeline in 2009. This pipeline, which carries daily nearly 300 million cubic meters of Russian natural gas through Ukraine to Europe, began to reduce the flow rate at the beginning of January, the transport being due to be stopped completely. The disturbance had a significant impact on many Member States, especially on those which entirely depend on this supply route, leaving households without heat and causing the abandonment of production in certain industries. Gas supply was fully restored on 21 January 2009. This disturbance was the most important of its kind in Europe's recent history: for an unprecedented period of 2 weeks, Europe was deprived of 30% of natural gas imports, which equals 20% of the stock of natural gas. The need for coordination, at European level, thus becomes clear and is recognized by the Natural Gas Infrastructure of Europe (NGIE), representing the operators in this sector. NGIE has expressed support of EPCIP program and proposed the development of a common methodology for the analysis of risks/threats in Europe for natural gas infrastructures, having an approach of all the hazards. This would be consistent with the coordination implemented in natural gas by the Council regulation 994/2010, namely preparing for a national risk analysis, establishment of preventive measures and the elaboration of emergency plans based on a profound risk analysis. 
